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Abstract
This research reveals the means and methods by which US and 
Soviet space physicists -- specifically the US team headed by 
James A. Van Allen and the Soviet team headed by Leonid 
Sedov -- were able to communicate and share theories, 
information and data during 1957-59, the earliest days of the 
“space race” . This research shows that, despite US-Soviet 
political polarisation, suspicion and mistrust, these scientists 
established and sustained formal and informal communication 
strategies that allowed them to work cooperatively as an 
international space science community while exploring a 
“common frontier of ignorance” . It is the author’s conclusion that 
such communication was possible only as a direct result of 
personal and professional commitments by these scientists to 
ensure that science took precedence over politics, despite a 
Cold War and a heated arms race. Research methods included 
multiple personal interviews with Van Allen and extensive 
correspondence with Soviet space physicist Yuri L. Galperin. This 
research also involved extensive documentary review of primary 
source materials archived within the James A. Van Allen Papers 
and Related Collections of the University of Iowa Archives in 
Iowa City, Iowa, in the United States. This research reveals how 
these American and Soviet scientists established and maintained 
ongoing, direct and indirect channels of communication.
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Com m unicating  Science in the Sputnik Era
By Tom Walsh
Father Christmas, W estern Union and the CIA
Well buried within the thousands of documents that constitute the 
James A. Van Allen Papers at the University of Iowa Archives is a 
brightly coloured holiday greeting card. The card is carefully 
die-cut so that, as it unfolds, it spills forth a scene of Father 
Christmas (in Russian, Ded M oroz) on a sled amid children, 
elves and animals dancing and playing in pine forest bathed in 
snowfall. Its printed greeting, in Russian, says: “ S novim G odom !" 
Hand-scripted is the English translation of the same sentiment: 
“Happy New Year” (Van Allen Papers [VAP] Box 209 Folder 1 
[209:1]).
The undated holiday greeting card, mailed from Moscow over 40 
years ago to US space physics pioneer James A. Van Allen, is 
signed “Yu. I. Galperin” . It was a personal greeting from Yuri L. 
Galperin, a space physics researcher within the U.S.S.R.
Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Physics and the Atmosphere.
An experiment Galperin helped to develop was carried into 
space on May 15, 1958, aboard Sputnik III and contributed to the 
discovery of low-energy trapped electrons in the Earth’s upper 
atmosphere (Galperin e-mail).
An equally curious document within the Van Allen papers is a 
copy of a Western Union telegram dated May, 18, 1960, and 
addressed to Professor Leonid I. Sedov, then president of the 
International Astronautical Federation and a prominent 
academician within the international space physics community. 
“Respectfully request telemetry code of new Sputnik” , the 
telegram ’s message reads. “Will forward our magnetic tape 
recording to you if you w ish” . The message wired to Moscow 
was signed: J. A. Van Allen, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, 
Iowa USA (VAP 209:1).
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A third telling document is a hand-written note attached to a 
simple business card and a typewritten list of questions. The note 
is dated September 11 and was written in 1959, soon after Van 
Allen returned to his laboratory on the University of Iowa campus 
from a space physics conference in Moscow. “Your secretary 
tells me that today is not the day to see you” , the note begins. “ I 
came by to check on whether you had written your ‘trip report’ as 
of y e t. ... If it is not written, we would be grateful if you could 
consider the enclosed questions when you prepare it” .
The typewritten list includes 10 questions, each seeking specific, 
detailed information about the “scope and quality” of “cosmic ray 
research in the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries” . The questions ask 
Van Allen to identify scientists and institutes involved in Soviet 
space research. One question also asks Van Allen to “note any 
incidents in which the Soviets appeared to be evasive or 
secretive about any of the aspects of their work” .
The hand-written note is signed “Scott Cohen”, the same name 
that appears on the simple business card, which shows a 
Chicago phone number and a Lake Shore Drive address in 
Chicago (VAP 209:8).
“He was CIA” , Van Allen said in a July 2000 interview. “Or at least 
that was my presumption” . This September 1959 visit by the CIA 
to Van A llen’s laboratory was not the first -  nor the last -- 
interaction between Van Allen and the American intelligence 
community, which was always eager to learn whatever it could 
about the Soviet space effort (J. Van Allen interview).
Collectively, these three documents capture the spirit -- as well as 
some of the realities -  of efforts by US and Soviet space 
scientists to communicate cooperatively as an international space 
science community. Their efforts to exchange insights and 
information about common research interests were complicated 
-  and in some cases precluded -  by US-Soviet political 
polarisation during the earliest days of international space
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exploration. Long-established, non-governmental, international 
scientific organisations, under the umbrella of the International 
Geophysical Year (1957-58), had proposed elaborate 
mechanisms for collecting and sharing scientific data, findings and 
theories about the earliest space science experiments involving 
rockets and satellites. But, in reality, many of these proposed 
informational exchange strategies would never be realized, at 
least not those associated with the earliest US and Soviet satellite 
missions.
Politically, space physics research involving rockets and satellites 
was about much more than science. With both the US and the 
USSR using adaptations of their most sophisticated ballistic 
missile systems to put space physics experiments into orbit, the 
earliest satellite launches were shrouded in secrecy and plagued 
by cumbersome limitations on exchange of information. It was a 
situation that prompted American and Soviet space scientists to 
devise and to rely upon their own strategies for professional 
collaboration.
In the earliest days of space science (1957-59), Van Allen and his 
Soviet colleagues relied on makeshift channels of communication 
built on personal and professional relationships. They 
communicated through papers presented at international 
conferences or published in long-established, international 
scientific journals. They discussed their work during politically 
sensitive visits to one another’s laboratories. Infrequently, they 
met face-to-face and exchanged closely-monitored 
correspondence. More frequently, in their efforts to understand 
what each team was learning about the nature of the universe, 
they relied on translations of stories clipped from newspapers 
like Pravda and The New York Times.
“The possibility of doing things with satellites and rockets was a 
byproduct of military developments” , Van Allen said in a July 2000 
interview. “And it was always ambiguous whether what we were 
doing was classified of not. There was a haze of ambiguity that
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hung over our work. There was a fair level of security, and we 
were always strictly constrained in talking about the performance 
of our rockets and the telemetry and electronics involved. We 
were constrained as a matter of national policy. It was just 
understood that there were certain things not to be discussed -- 
the launch and delivery system -- and it was sort of an honor 
system” (J. Van Allen interview).
“Frontiers of ignorance”
In 1957, the year of Sputnik, scientists knew very little about the 
atmosphere surrounding Earth beyond a distance of a few 
hundred miles. What little was known was based on data 
collected by Van Allen and others, using basic instruments 
tethered to high-altitude weather balloons or carried to high 
altitudes by crude rockets incapable of breaking free of the 
Earth’s gravitational pull. Scientists knew even less about the 
solar system and the other planets, their knowledge limited to 
best-guess interpretations of fuzzy images collected by Earth- 
bound telescopes. Only 50 years ago it was widely believed that 
there were seasonal changes on Mars related to some form of 
plant life. Some scientists were convinced there were civilised life 
forms on the red planet, while others envisioned Venus, always 
shrouded in clouds, as a planet of foggy swamps (Park 73-74).
With both the personal and professional demands of World War 
II behind them, James A. Van Allen and other space physicists 
worldwide were eager to get on with the business of learning all 
they could about the earth's outer atmosphere. Both in the US 
and in the Soviet Union, rocket vehicles originally engineered as 
weapon delivery systems were being adapted to scientific 
research as Van Allen and his Soviet counterparts began 
defining a new branch of scientific inquiry: space science.
“Space science is not a professional discipline in the usual sense 
of that term as exemplified by the traditional terms astronomy,
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geology, physics, chemistry and biology” , Van Allen wrote in 
1990:
Rather it is a loosely defined mixture of all these 
fields plus an exotic and expensive operational style.
The distinctive features of space science are the 
use of rocket vehicles for propelling scientific 
equipment through and beyond the appreciable 
atmosphere of the earth; the rigorous mechanical, 
electrical, and thermal requirements of such 
equipment; and (usually) the remote control 
of the equipment and the radio transmission of 
data from distant points in space to an investigator 
at a ground laboratory (Van Allen 1).
In 1946, while on terminal leave from the US Navy, Van Allen 
worked as a physicist at the Applied Physics Laboratory first 
established by Johns Hopkins University in 1942 in a large, 
rented Chevrolet garage in Silver Spring, Maryland. The 
laboratory’s work then extended to the fields of cosmic rays, the 
solar ultraviolet spectra, high-altitude photography, atm ospheric 
ozone and ionospheric currents. Among Van A llen’s tasks were 
initiating and supervising developm ent of a high-performance 
sounding rocket, the Aerobee (Van Allen 13).
Designed exclusively for scientific purposes, the Aerobee soon 
joined the German-designed V -2 rocket as a basic vehicle for 
high-altitude research (Burrows 63). Between 1946 and 1951, 
payloads of scientific instruments were carried aloft by 48 V-2s 
and 30 Aerobees. While most were launched from the White 
Sands Proving Grounds in New Mexico, Van Allen organised a 
series of successful Aerobee-firing expeditions aboard the USS 
Norton Sound  as it traversed the Pacific Ocean between the Gulf 
of Alaska and the Equatorial Pacific, allowing high-altitude data to 
be collected at various geophysical locations.
The entire effort was overseen by a group called the “V-2 Rocket 
Panel” (later renamed the “Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research
8
Panel” and, still later, the “Rocket and Satellite Research Panel”). 
Beginning in the early 1950s, members of the panel became 
instrumental in promoting the concept of a 1957-58 International 
Geophysical Year (IGY) and in actively encouraging the use of 
scientific satellites of the earth as an important -  and, at that point 
in space physics research, unprecedented -- component of the 
IGY program (Van Allen 14).
“ It is important to understand the context of the times” , Van Allen, 
then 85, said in a July 2000 interview:
In the late 1950s, the whole effort to use rockets 
and satellites for atmospheric research was well 
organised as an international effort in which the 
Soviets were active. Despite the Cold War situation, 
this was being done through non-governmental 
cooperation. The International Geophysical Year 
was a collaboration between national science 
academies and individuals. Our National Academy 
of Sciences was the primary participant for the US, 
but it was not a part of the federal government.
We and the Russians had a common understanding 
of the state of the scientific field in which we were 
working. It was no surprise to me, or to anyone else I 
imagine, that we were doing the same things (in terms 
of research). We shared a frontier of ignorance about 
the upper atmosphere.
“More and more uncertain. ”
Just how much there was to be learned about the physics of the 
upper atmosphere is blatantly apparent in a May 2, 1946, book- 
length report by Project RAND -  then active within the 
engineering division of the Douglas Aircraft Company in Santa 
Monica, California. Entitled “Prelim inary Design of an 
Experimental W orld-Circling Spaceship” , the report was
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commissioned by the US Navy and Major General Curtis E.
LeMay, then deputy chief of the air staff for research and 
development. The first appendix of the report, written by G. 
Grimminger, is entitled “The Upper A tm osphere” .
“ In evaluating the performance of a very high altitude vehicle, 
such as that described in this report, it becomes necessary to 
have values for the physical properties of the upper atmosphere 
at extremely high altitudes, which heretofore were of little interest 
to the aeronautical engineer” , Grimminger wrote:
Conditions in these high altitude regions have 
received some attention, both theoretical and 
experimental, in the past 20 or 25 years by a 
relatively small number of investigators. However, 
the present knowledge of the physical state of 
the upper atmosphere is far from complete, and 
as will become apparent in the course of the 
discussion, at the high levels there is quite some 
differences of opinion as to what the conditions 
are; at still higher levels there are practically no 
data or opinions available at all. In short, the 
knowledge of the atmosphere becomes more 
and more uncertain and speculative with increasing 
altitude. ... In general, workers in the field appear 
to be in fair agreement as to the atmospheric 
properties from sea level up to 60 miles altitude.
Above this altitude the knowledge and agreement 
is [sic] much less definite (Douglas 1-A).
The summary of this 1946 feasibility study, which was researched 
and written under a three-week deadline, concludes “modern 
technology has advanced to the point where it now appears 
feasible to undertake the design of a satellite vehicle” (Douglas i). 
The study’s abstract goes on to put a pricetag of $150 million on 
the process of designing, constructing and launching a “satellite 
vehicle” . The study further predicts “such an undertaking could be 
accomplished in approximately five years tim e” (Douglas viii).
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Under that time line, the Douglas Aircraft Company was 
suggesting the United States could launch an earth-orbiting 
satellite in 1951 -- six years before the task would become the 
historic accomplishment of the Soviet Union.
The Dinner Party Origins of IGY
The idea for the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year 
emerged from a small dinner party held at Van A llen ’s home in 
Silver Spring, Maryland, on April 5, 1950 (Sullivan 20). Van Allen 
and other geophysicists in attendance attributed the idea to Lloyd 
V. Berkner, the scientist who subsequently spent years 
organising the international effort. Berkner’s idea was both simple 
and profound: the common study of Earth by all nations for the 
benefit of all of mankind. The IGY would extend from July 1, 1957, 
through December 31,1958. It was an 18-month time period 
selected to correspond with an anticipated period of maximum 
sunspot activity expected to generate geom agnetic “storm s” that 
disturb the Earth’s outer atmosphere.
It was an ambitious programme that would eventually attract the 
participation of some 60,000 scientists from 66 nations, working 
at observation stations established, literally, from pole to pole.
After the fact, IGY would be described by one of its chief 
American architects, Hugh Odishaw, as “the single most 
significant peaceful activity of mankind since the Renaissance and 
the Copernican Revolution'' (Sullivan 4).
The basic concept of an IGY was hardly new. In 1882-83 
scientists from 11 nations collaborated in a scientific enterprise 
known as the International Polar Year. Its purpose was to study 
the geophysics of earth ’s polar regions, specifically the Arctic and 
its weather. The 11 nations involved mounted expeditions that 
established polar meteorological, magnetic and auroral 
observation centres that collected data for 12 to 13 months 
(Chapman 95).
The first International Polar Year was the 19th Century outgrowth 
of efforts begun in the 17th Century to create national academies 
of science that would promote the progress and prestige of 
scientific inquiry (Chapman 94). Visits and “friendly 
correspondence” linked this small network of national academies 
and their members to facilitate international exchange of scientific 
knowledge. Of particular interest was the earth ’s magnetic field, 
as fluctuations played havoc with the mariner’s compass. Efforts 
to understand the earth ’s magnetic changes prompted the 
formation of an international “Magnetic Union” under the 
guidance of Carl Friedrich Gauss, the German mathematician, 
astronomer and physicist. Magnetic observation stations 
established in several locations throughout the world recorded 
observations using a common methodology. While this effort 
continued only for a few years, it represented an important 
precedent in international scientific cooperation and data 
exchange.
Like magnetic fluctuations, weather affected maritime traffic as 
well. Throughout the 19th Century, one country after another in 
Europe and North America created weather services to observe, 
record and predict weather. As such services grew in number, 
their directors began to meet at occasional conferences, which 
resulted in international coordination of instruments and methods 
of observation. This standardisation resulted in a network of 
observing stations using organised means and codes for easy 
and quick interchange of meteorological information (Chapman 
95).
The first International Polar Year was an extension of this co­
operative weather research. “At first most of these weather 
services were in the countries of Europe and North Am erica” , 
wrote Chapman, who would serve as president of the 
international committee that would organise the 1957-58 IGY. 
“Their domains surrounded the almost unknown Arctic region. It 
was natural to believe that this region might seriously influence 
weather changes in the surrounding countries. Hence it was
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judged important to study the weather over this region -- despite 
difficulties of access and inhospitable conditions. (It was) for this 
reason the conference of directors of weather services 
organized an enterprise called the International Polar Year” 
(Chapman 95).
Over the next 30 years, cartographers, seismologists and 
astronomers began organising their own international 
organisations. These groups sponsored and coordinated 
research requiring global observations. World War I (1914-18) 
disrupted many of these early international attempts at scientific 
cooperation. After the war an International Research Council 
was created by the national science academies of the victorious 
nations under language that excluded scientists of the defeated 
nations. The Council sponsored several “ international scientific 
unions” covering a variety of scientific fields, including astronomy, 
geodesy, geophysics, radio science, seismology, meteorology, 
terrestrial magnetism and electricity, oceanography, volcanology 
and hydrology. Other unions were created for geography, pure 
and applied physics, pure and applied chemistry, biology and the 
history of science (Chapman 95).
The exclusionary nature of these unions was eventually 
addressed when the International Research Council was 
transformed in 1931 into a new organisation, the International 
Council of Scientific Unions (Sullivan 25). The various unions 
under its sponsorship removed exclusionary statutes, but many 
of the once-excluded scientists remained bitter, with some of their 
excluded national academies refusing to affiliate with the new 
Council.
Between World Wars I and II, the newly organised International 
Meteorological Organization took the lead in renewing the 
International Polar Year enterprise of 1882-83. A Second 
International Polar Year was organised for 1932-33 -  the 50th 
anniversary of the inaugural endeavor. The scope remained 
largely unchanged -  weather and magnetism -- with the important
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addition of observations of the Arctic ionosphere, a highly 
“electrical” region of the earth ’s upper atmosphere that was 
unknown at the time of the first International Polar Year. Most 
scientific unions suspended their activities during World W ar II, 
but the organisations persisted. After the war the establishment of 
the United Nations resulted in creation of an inter-governmental 
organisation for the advancement of education, science and 
culture, namely the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). By contrast, the international 
scientific unions and their sponsoring body -- the International 
Council of Scientific Unions -- were non-governmental, though 
affiliated with national science academies worldwide.
Late in 1950, Sydney Chapman worked with Lloyd Berkner to 
pitch the concept of a “third Polar Year” to the Joint Commission 
on the Ionosphere, an organisational link to three scientific 
unions associated with astronomy, radio science and geodesy 
and geophysics. The Commission endorsed the plan and 
recommended the project to its three affiliated unions and the 
International Council of Scientific Unions, which ultimately 
adopted the resolution and appointed a special committee to 
organise the project. When invitations went out to national 
academies worldwide, there was little enthusiasm. After the 
project was widened to include a scientific study of the entire 
planet, not only Arctic regions, there was better response. In 
1953 the special committee -- now known as CSAGI (an acronym 
taken from the French title of the committee -- Comite Special de 
I ’Annee Geophysique Internationale) -  decreed that the 
International Geophysical “Year” would include 18 months, from 
July 1, 1957, through December 31,1958.
As president of CSAGI, Chapman was among those concerned 
that, by August of 1953, the Soviet Union had not opted to 
participate. An overview of the IGY organizational effort to date 
appearing over C hapm an’s signature in the prestigious journal 
Nature  ended with this plea for Soviet cooperation:
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But the enterprise will not be fully successful 
unless all the major nations of the scientific 
culture participate in it. For this reason, at the 
request of the Special Committee, the 
International Council of Scientific Unions has 
formally invited the renewal in this enterprise 
of the valuable and effective cooperation given 
by Russia to the First and Second Polar Years; 
and also has requested that the USSR should 
cooperate in encouraging other nations to take 
part that have not yet agreed to do so (Chapman 
327).
The US National Committee for the IGY (USNC-IGY) was 
established in February of 1953 by the National Academy of 
Sciences/National Research Council (NAS/NRC). As of March 
1954, 28 nations had signified their intent to participate, but not as 
yet the Soviet Union. In response to a proposal by IGY 
organisers on October 4, 1954, that governments worldwide use 
earth-orbiting satellites in space research during the IGY, The 
Soviet Academy of Sciences named a blue-ribbon commission to 
“organize work concerned with building an autom atic laboratory 
for scientific research in space ...” (Caidin 70-71). On July 30,
1955 -- 26 months before Sputnik and one day after a sim ilar 
American commitment -- Moscow committed the USSR to satellite 
launches during IGY, with Leonoid I. Sedov, chairman of the 
Soviet Academ y’s blue-ribbon commission, then predicting the 
first Soviet launch within two years. Eventually, 66 countries 
would participate in IGY, but not China due to political concerns 
about the independent participation of Formosa.
The role of satellites
In August of 1955, the proposed US program for the IGY was 
submitted by the US National Committee for the IGY in a report to 
the NAS/NRC. In the “satellite measurements” section of the
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report the US Committee spelled outs its intention to develop and 
launch “an earth-circling satellite vehicle” that would make long­
term observations possible.
On page 68 of that same report, the US Committee makes clear 
its intent to share information about satellite launches and 
scientific instruments carried into space:
The satellite vehicle will orbit above the earth 
at altitudes between 200 miles at perigee and 
perhaps 800 miles at apogee. In encircling the 
earth, it will be observable by many countries 
and from many IGY stations being established 
for the overall IGY program. In order to realize 
the greatest possible benefit from this undertaking, 
complete information about the orbiting vehicle 
and its instrumentation will be made available to 
the nations participating in the IGY program so 
that those countries can take part in the observation 
and use of it (VA 236:6).
In a speech delivered before the American Rocket Society in 
Chicago on November 16, 1955, Dr. Joseph Kaplan, chairman of 
the US National Committee for IGY, outlined the importance of 
rockets and earth-circling satellites to atmospheric research. 
Kaplan told his audience that the indirect observations of earth- 
bound space scientists left “much yet to be observed and 
learned” (VAP 236:6).
Kaplan predicted in his speech that during the IGY the US would 
fire “hundreds” of rocket-based research vehicles of the type 
developed by Van Allen, all in an effort to collect basic data 
inaccessible to ground-based experiments:
“Lacking these data, for example, most existing 
theories on the cause and formation of the aurora, 
or the changes and fluctuations of the earth ’s 
magnetic field are very incomplete. Even in the 
case of the ionosphere there is, as yet, no
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completely satisfactory theory. . . . The relations 
between the aurora, ionospheric currents, 
high-altitude winds and observed fluctuations 
in the earth ’s magnetic field are still to be 
c la rified .... These examples indicate but a few 
of the many and complex problems in the high 
atmosphere awaiting solution. A fundamental 
purpose of the rocket IGY program is to shed 
further light upon such questions as these.
Those questions extended across a wide spectrum of disciplines, 
he said, including atmospheric structure and composition, 
radiation studies, particle studies, and ionospheric and 
geomagnetic measurement. Beyond rockets, Kaplan said, earth- 
circling satellites would allow long-term observations not 
possible with short-duration rocket flights. It was Kaplan, in fact, 
who coined the widely-used expression “LPR” -- Long Playing 
Rockets -- to describe earth-circling satellites. “The basic 
techniques for the launching and instrumentation of an artificial 
earth satellite are now available” , he said some 23 months before 
Sputnik, “and it is planned to launch a number of such vehicles as 
part of the US IGY program” . He went on to say that the executive 
committee of the USNC-IGY had proposed a “m inimum” satellite 
program of 10 “instrumented birds, with the expectation that at 
least five of the birds will be successfully launched into their 
orbits, circulating about the earth for a period of about two 
weeks, at heights of about 200 to 800 miles” .
Kaplan noted that availability of raw data from rocket and satellite 
observations during the IGY constituted much of the “value” of the 
research effort. “The reception by scientists of the 40 or more 
nations which will participate in the IGY of the news of the 
proposed US satellite was a warm one indeed” , he said. “ In part, 
this reception was based in the knowledge that the value of the 
observations made during the IGY would be enhanced greatly by 
the availability of the direct data obtainable only by rockets and 
satellites” .
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Communicating data
Early in the 17th Century, Francis Bacon is said to have asserted 
that “experiments in concert” represented the most effective way 
to comprehend the world around us. And the history of the two 
polar years and IGY represented a culmination of a growing 
awareness of the validity of Bacon’s assertion (Sullivan 4).
The logistics of IGY project data collection and availability were a 
key component of the international purposes of IGY. As 
proposed, two IGY World Data Centres (WDC) were envisioned 
as repositories for data and results submitted by IGY research 
scientists worldwide. The US-based WDC would collect and 
disseminate original data from studies conducted in North,
Central and South America, while the Moscow-based WDC 
would perform an identical function for all other regions. Both 
Centres would exchange data so that each could serve as a 
scientific archive of all IGY research data collected world-wide.
An August 9, 1956, USNC-IGY report on the proposed US IGY 
WDC contained this description of how the Centre would 
operate: “ It will provide continuous indexing and cataloging 
services available to all interested scientists, so that the receipt or 
scheduled receipt of data will be known within the interested 
scientific community. Upon request, the Center will provide copies 
of all desired data to scientists of all countries in the Western 
Hemisphere.” (VAP 239:4) The report said data formats might 
include film or magnetic tape, summary tables, and pre-prints and 
reprints of scientific articles and published volumes of compiled 
data summaries. Monthly or quarterly exchanges were seen then 
as a “realistic minimum average plan” .
The US Centre, as proposed by NAS/NRC in 1956, would 
oversee operations of eight regional data centers, each branch 
staffed by specialists equipped with an archive of pre-IGY data. 
The organisational blueprint showed regional branches
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throughout the U.S. with close ties to long-established space 
physics research centres, including a long list of universities. The 
proposal called for these “ recognized research institutions” to 
accept “responsibility for archive and cataloging services for each 
scientific field of investigation during IGY”, thereby providing a 
“mechanism of world-w ide exchange and reproduction of data, 
paper storage and facilities for visiting scientists” .
In late September 1957, CSAGI convened a Conference on 
Rockets and Satellites in Washington, DC. Minutes of the 
proceeding of the working groups that met during this conference 
indicate a high level of interest and priority in sharing data and 
observations among the international space physics community 
(VAP 240:1).
The meeting of the CSAGI Working Group on Rocketry involved 
two sessions, the first on October 2, another on October 3. In 
attendance were scientists representing the US, the USSR, the 
UK, Canada, Japan, Australia, Peru and Ecuador. At the top of 
this Working G roup’s agenda was the issue of “ interchange of 
rocket launching data” and “international exchange of 
instrumentation and personnel” (VAP 240:1).
Specifically, this Group reviewed and refined language pertaining 
to launch data submissions to World Data Centres on rockets 
fired during the IGY. As a template, the Group used a “flight 
information summary” developed by US scientists. The two-page 
form was designed to be completed by launching groups. The 
general information requested included identification of the rocket 
used; the time, date and location of the launch; the objectives of 
the launch; prelim inary flight information; a description of 
equipment flown and ground-based equipment used in tracking 
and telemetry; and preliminary results.
After deletion of what the proceedings of the meeting termed 
“non-essential portions” of the form, Soviet delegate A.M. Kasatkin 
agreed to use of the form “in principle” but requested 24 hours to
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review the form before giving final consent. The next day,
Kasatkin indicated agreement to the amended form, but 
announced that, while the USSR would comply fully with regard 
to launching of meteorological rockets, only information on 
experimentation and containers would be supplied for 
geophysical rockets. In other words, data provided by the USSR 
on its satellite missions would be limited.
The Working Group stipulated in its final resolution that data 
compiled on the flight information summary form for rockets fired 
during the IGY be forwarded to every country participating in the 
IGY’s worldwide rocketry program. The resolution also stipulated 
that the information be provided “within two weeks after each 
rocket firing” . The same data, the resolution said, would be sent to 
each of two proposed IGY World Data Centres, one housed 
within the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, the other at the 
National Academy of Sciences in Washington, DC.
A subsequent Working Group discussion on exchange of raw 
data and other information not requested on the amended form 
resulted in agreement that dissemination of such data “be left to 
the discretion of the launching group” . The proceedings also note 
that “dissemination of all processed data, other than the 
preliminary information appearing on the form, was to follow the 
normal procedures of publication in scientific journals” .
During the Working G roup’s discussion of international 
exchange of instruments and personnel, Kasatkin endorsed the 
concept of exchange of visits to laboratories and “instrument 
preparation locations” and indicated that visits to the Soviets’ 
Franz Josef Land launch site would “probably” be arranged “but 
he had no information regarding the arrangem ent of visits to the 
other launching sites” . Further discussion centred on the value of 
using such exchanges to standardise experimentation. According 
to the proceedings, “ It was generally felt that this would be a 
desirable aim of such exchanges” . Ultimately it was resolved that 
a working group be formed to establish the details of a plan for
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implementing such exchanges “with a view towards the eventual 
establishment of standard measurements and their accuracies” .
At the same conference, the Working Group on Satellite Vehicles, 
Launching, Tracking and Computation met in sessions that 
spanned three days, October 1-3. In attendance at one or more 
sessions were representatives of the US, the USSR, India, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Canada, Japan, the UK, Australia and Iran, as well as 
CSAGI officials. Among the resolutions unanimously approved 
was Resolution Two, which “ recommends" that the US and 
USSR “make arrangements for the rapid dissemination of 
information on satellite orbits, both immediate data including 
single observations prior to the establishment of orbit and 
subsequent data in the form of orbital elements from which the 
orbit may be computed” . This resolution specifically recommends 
that the US send data to a global interchange network and to the 
USSR Academy of Sciences. It also recommends that the USSR 
send data to the same global interchange network and to the 
Smithsonian Institution’s Astrophysical Observatory.
At a meeting of the Working Group on Satellite Internal 
Experiments and Instrumentation Program, Dr. H. Friedman 
presented a summary of the US satellite internal experiments. On 
the subject of telemetry, UK representative W.T. Blackband noted 
that a USSR satellite was of particular interest as it would pass 
over the UK. Blackband “stressed the need” for making full 
technical details available in sufficient time to facilitate advance 
preparation. Specifically, Blackband asked both the USSR and 
the US to provide telemetry details that included the number of 
channels, the characteristics of each channel, the information 
contained in each channel, and the criteria for establishing the 
value of recorded data.
In response, the Soviet delegation announced that the first 
Russian satellite would carry 20 and 40 Mc/s transmitters, but that 
any decisions on frequencies to be used in subsequent satellite 
launchings would be based on the degree of success of the first
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satellites “and recommendations of this conference” . The USSR 
requested that the recommendations of the conference be 
supported by “detailed and specific reasons” .
Meeting the next day (Oct. 2, 1957), the Working Group adopted 
the following resolution: “ It is highly desirable that there be an 
exchange of publications, technical data, and scientific 
instruments pertaining to satellites, and it is recommended to the 
National Committees of both the United States and the USSR that 
they draw up and present to each other their specific proposals 
for such exchange” .
Also adopted was a resolution suggesting that organisation of a 
small but “permanent” group on rockets and satellites would be 
“very useful” for “coordination and exchange of information 
during the IGY and after” .
A Soviet surprise
The Conference’s final session was convened on the morning of 
Saturday, October 5, 1957, within hours of those attending 
having learned of their Soviet colleagues’ successful overnight 
launch of Sputnik I. Many had been guests the night before at a 
reception hosted by the Russians in the ballroom of the Soviet 
Embassy in Washington, as had W alter Sullivan, the chief science 
writer for The New York Times. In the midst of the reception, a 
Soviet Embassy official told Sullivan he had a phone call. The call 
was from The New York Times’ W ashington DC news bureau, 
wanting Sullivan to be aware that Radio Moscow had just 
announced the successful launch of Sputnik I.
“At the conference ... the Russians had said they would make no 
advance announcement of their first attempt,” Sullivan said in his 
1961 book-length history and analysis of the IGY (Sullivan 1). 
“They told their American colleagues, almost in so many words, 
‘We will not cackle until we have laid our egg’” .
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Sullivan hung up the phone and found Lloyd V. Berkner, the 
American scientist serving as chairman of the committee 
overseeing IGY activities. Berkner silenced the room by clapping 
his hands loudly and told the assembled guests of the historic 
Soviet achievement. The irony of the Americans making the 
announcement to the Russians in their own embassy was not 
lost on Sullivan, nor likely the Russians.
Before Sputnik, Sullivan said, IGY had been little more to the 
public than a curiosity attracting occasional news coverage. “The 
effect of this launching was not to give a great boost to the IGY 
and its noble goals of international cooperation in science,” he 
wrote. “Rather it sent a shudder through large parts of the world. 
The fact suddenly became inescapable that the largest nation in 
the world, geographically, was also the strongest in a field critical 
to war-making -- rocketry” .
Berkner opened the conference’s final session by noting the 
historic announcement of the Sputnik and introducing A.A. 
Blagonravov of the Soviet delegation, who described “pertinent 
facts” about Sputnik. “He stated that a polished sphere was used 
in order to facilitate visual observation. This first satellite, he said, 
contained only a transmitter and a power supply and had four 
antennas mounted in the outside. He predicted a life of about two 
weeks for the power supply” (VAP 240:1).
Though the launch itself may have come as a surprise, the Soviet 
satellite programme was well-known -- and long-known -- to the 
international space science community. Van Allen recalls 
attending a seminar in 1956 at the University of Michigan in Ann 
Arbor at which the subject of the scientific uses of satellites was 
discussed. He was also involved with the technical panel that 
invited, reviewed and ranked proposals for research experim ents 
involving earth-orbiting satellites. “ In the circles in which I 
operated” , he said in a June 1999 interview, “the successful 
launch of an earth-orbiting satellite was pretty well anticipated. 
The big question was what are we going to do with them ”?
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The existence of an official Soviet space-flight programme can be 
traced to a 1953 statement by Soviet Academician A.N. 
Nesmeyahov, who as president of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences was familiar with all aspects of Soviet scientific 
progress. In his November 27, 1953, address to the World Peace 
Council in Vienna, as reported in the November 28, 1953, edition 
of Pravda, Nesmeyahov said, “Science has reached a state at 
which it is feasible to send a stratroplane to the moon, and to 
create an artificial satellite of the earth.” Later, when a team of 
Soviet scientists was organized to build a Russian satellite, it was 
hardly a secret; the news was broadcast on Radio Moscow 
(McDougall 60).
In fact, many of the same IGY scientists in attendance that 
Saturday morning had also attended the IGY conference a year 
earlier in Barcelona, Spain, from September 9-14, 1956. At that 
conference, the Soviet IGY delegation outlined its plans for a 
satellite in “great detail” , according to Van Allen. The Soviet 
delegation said in Barcelona a launch date was uncertain, but 
only a matter of time.
“There was one of these IGY meetings in Barcelona in 1956, at 
which we described what we intended” , Van Allen said in a July 
2000 interview:
I was the chairman of what I think was called 
the ‘satellite working group’. I presented the plans 
that we had, the scientific programme that we had 
developed, and the Soviets did the same thing, 
including presenting their plans for artificial satellites. 
Vanguard (the name given to the early US satellite 
programme) was very open in terms of scientific 
intentions. In terms of launch vehicles, I knew we 
were trying and hoped we would succeed.
The primary means of exchanging information with 
our foreign colleagues were extensive international 
meetings at which each country presented plans for
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what it intended to do. That’s why I wasn’t really 
shocked by the Sputnik launch. The Soviets had 
made presentations at these meetings where they 
announced their intentions, but no one knew when 
it would happen. It wasn’t announced immediately 
prior to the launch.
Early in 1957 an article spread over two issues of the respected 
Soviet journal Uspekhi Fizicheskih Nauk (“Progress in the 
Physical Sciences”) included a full description of the “scientific 
tasks ahead” in what would later be the launch of Sputnik III on 
May 15, 1958 (Galperin, correspondence). Three weeks prior to 
the Sputnik launch, the Kremlin used September 17, 1957 -  the 
100th anniversary of the birth of Soviet aeronautics pioneer 
Konstantin Tsiolkovsky -  to promise the world that a satellite was 
coming soon. Now, it was here.
Dr. John P. Hagen of the US Naval Research Laboratory, 
followed Blagonravov to the lectern and told the Conference 
attendees that the Minitrack observing network had detected 
Sputnik on its third or fourth orbit, and that further efforts were 
being made to to track the satellite. The network, he said, had 
been designed to track at 108 Mc/s, but that some of the stations 
were quickly being modified to track at 40 Mc/s as well (40 Mc/s 
was one of the two frequencies satellite indicated by the USSR 
at the Conference four days earlier, during the Oct. 1 meeting of 
the Working Group on Satellite Internal Experiments and 
Instrumentation Program). Hagen played an audio tape of 
Sputnik’s telemetered signal, which had been recorded overnight.
The President of the US National Academy of Sciences, Dr.
Detlev Bronk, attended the final session to congratulate the 
Conference on its achievements and to congratulate the USSR 
National Committee on the successful Sputnik launch. Dr. Bronk 
closed his remarks with this statement: “All scientists are fellow 
explorers on the frontiers of knowledge, who rejoice and benefit 
in the discoveries and achievements of their colleagues. And so
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we of the United States rejoice in yesterday’s great achievement 
of our Russian colleagues and applaud their success” (VAP 
240:1).
“The rascals outdid us”
In retrospect, Van Allen notes that the successful launch of 
Sputnik I helped to jum p-start the American satellite effort. “The 
Soviet success provided a great impetus for our work” , he said in 
a June 1999 interview. “The notion of putting up a satellite 
seemed trivial (to the US government) until the Soviets did it” .
At the time of Sputnik, he said, the US government was engaged 
in “endless analysis” of competing satellite programmes being 
overseen by the US Army and the US Navy. Much of the debate, 
he said, centred on which launch vehicle would be utilised in a 
satellite launch, with the focus on technology with intercontinental 
ballistic missile applications. Although the IGY activities in which 
Van Allen and thousands of other space scientists were involved 
were non-military efforts, he does recall US government 
“observers” quietly keeping tabs on IGY proceedings.
Nearly 50 years later, Van Allen still finds intriguing the extent of 
“public trauma” prompted by Sputnik I in the America and 
elsewhere. In the context of the Cold War, “in which people were 
afraid of everything” , Sputnik became “the essence of 
international trauma”, he said in 1999:
Sputnik was perceived as a fearsome object, flying 
overhead every 90 minutes, an object belonging to 
our sworn enemy. It reinforced our apprehension and 
tension about the Soviet Union and the notion that we 
were being outdone by a backward nation. The 
general perception of Russia was a huge, heavily 
populated, prim itive culture characterized by a low 
standard of living and a scarcity of the material things 
important to our culture -  refrigerators, cars. I think
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there was some respect for their m ilitary prowess as 
demonstrated in World War II, but they were seen 
as not being in the technical epoch we were. And 
then, suddenly, the rascals outdid us.
Ironically, a follow-on paper released nine-months after the May 
2,1946, release of the Douglas Aircraft Com pany feasibility study 
on “an experimental world-circling satellite” indirectly predicted 
the social and political fallout of the Sputnik launch. “Since 
mastery of the elements is a reliable index of material progress, 
the nation which first makes significant achievements in space 
travel will be acknowledged as the world leader in both military 
and scientific techniques” , wrote Jimmy Lipp, then head of Project 
RAND’s missile division and one of the paper’s contributors. “To 
visualize the impact on the world, one can imagine the 
consternation and admiration that would be felt here if the United 
States were to discover suddenly that some other nation had 
already put up a successful satellite” (Douglas Cover 3).
A “very great thrill!”
To his considerable dismay, Van Allen was thousands of miles 
from the Conference on Rockets and Satellites in Washington, 
D.C., where many of his space physics colleagues first learned of 
Sputnik. He was in the Antarctic, aboard the USS G lacier, 
where he was busy overseeing observations of cosmic ray 
intensity, using “rockoons” -- rockets tethered to high-altitude 
weather balloons, a device of Van Allen’s creation. “ I was pretty 
charged up” , he said in a December 2000 interview. “We were 
following the news as best we could. We were plugging away in 
the south Atlantic, and we were just in the dark, afraid we would 
be left out of the system”.
Van A llen’s unpublished, personal diary of the events of October 
4-5, 1957, shows that his initial interactions with Sputnik were 
those of a scientist well-schooled in the art of direct observation.
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Though his excitement is clear in logbook entries heavily salted 
with exclamation points, most of his efforts were directed at 
communicating directly with the world ’s first artificial satellite, 
deducing what he could about Sputnik from radio signals 
received onboard the USS Glacier. Those signals, he said, were 
remarkably strong. “ It was a very strong signal. Sputnik was 
putting out watts versus the US intention to use m illiwatts” .
“Yesterday night -- the 4th -- and early this morning were very 
exciting for me (as well as for the civilized world in general)” , he 
wrote in his logbook on October 5, 1957:
Just before dinner time Larry Cahill told me that 
news was just coming in on the ship’s news circuit 
that the Soviet Union had successfully launched 
a satellite. Factual details as follows:
Inclination of orbit 65 degrees to the earth’s equator 
Diameter 58 cm. Weight 83.6 kilograms (Wow!)
Estimated Height 900 kilometers (Perigee or apogee?) 
Period 1h 35m
Transmitted signal: 20.005 mc/sec
and 40.005 mc/sec with switching alternately from
one to the other -- spending about 0.3 sec on each
frequency.
Would pass over Moscow at 1:46 AM 
and at 6:22 AM on the 5th Moscow time.
(Moscow is -3 zone time from Greenwich) 
or rather +21
Our Ship’s Position 5 (degrees) 30 (minutes) N 92 
(degrees) W +6 zone time.
Van A llen’s logbook provides virtually a m inute-by-minute, highly 
detailed account of his activities during that historic evening, 
which began on October 4, 1957, with dinner, followed by what 
he remembers as a “very poor movie” .
After d in n e r... I went up to the communications shack 
to see if there was any further news available (about 
2120 ship’s time (+6). As I walked in to look at the
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teletype machine a young radioman [David Arm brust 
RM 3/c] wearing a pair of earphones & hovering 
over one of the ship’s communications receivers 
turned to me and said - ‘I think I have it!’ This was 
at 2120 or 03282 Greenwich time on the 5th of 
October.
I listened to the phones and heard a repetitive 
Beep-Beep-Beep-etc. of an audio frequency tone -- 
loud and clear. The r.f. frequency was very nearly 
20.005 mc/sec. I had earlier considered using our 
Clarke receiver but recalled that 55 mc/sec was 
their lowest frequency. Then I briefly considered 
the sh ip ’s capabilities but (too hastily) discarded 
this possibility on the general impression that the 
signal would be quite weak a la US plans and 
that the ship's communications gear would be 
inadequate in basic noise level.
However Mr. John Gniewek (formerly B.A. from 
Syracuse Univ.), young civilian employee of the 
US Coast and Geodetic Survey, who was a 
passenger on the Glacier going to the Antarctic to 
operate a magnetometer station there for the 
coming year, had been up to the communications 
shack earlier and had inquired if they could receive 
it. Armbrust had started looking with first success at 
-  0320 Z. He had also run a receiver calibration 
and had been listening & searching assiduously for 
some minutes.
My first reaction was: Could it possibly be true that 
this was the satellite transmission? (not a spurious 
effect of some kind -- or something from W .W V at 
20.000 mc/sec, etc.)
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At about this time Gniewek came up. He listened, 
also excitedly. It immediately occurred to me that 
we should make a recording! I thought of our 
Ampex in (the) rockoon lab but was somewhat 
discouraged of hauling it up to the comm, shack 
because of its weight and the way in which it was 
“built in” to Cahill’s apparatus! I remarked on this 
to Gniewek! He immediately responded that he 
had a small magnetic tape recorder in his room 
which he could easily bring up. I said fine! and 
rushed down to our rockoon lab to bring up my 
small Tectronix (Type 310) oscilloscope to look 
at the signal visually.
I first noted the time as 0329 Z on the clock in the 
comm, shack. Within about five minutes we were 
both in operation! I immediately found the following 
appearance on the scope.
Van A llen’s logbook notes then include his sketches of the 
oscilloscope pattern. “This began to look conclusive” , he wrote 
beneath the sketch. “ I had never heard a similar signal before! 
Very great thrill!”
Van A llen ’s notes continue for pages, detailing the night’s 
observational activities, both his own and those of others.
Toward the end of the logbook entry is a section he entitled 
“ Items” in which his astonishment at the Soviet m ilestone is clear. 
It includes the following notations:
1. Brilliant ach ievem ent!
2. Tremendous propaganda coup for USSR -- also
coming during CSAGI Rocket & Satellite Conference i 
in Washington.
3. Vehicle must be ~ 184/22 = 9 times as heavy as
Vanguard throughout if of same propulsive 
efficiency! ~  100 times gross launching weight
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(Also guidance accuracy!)
4. Confirms my disgust with the Stewart Com m ittee’s
decision to favor NRL (Naval Research Laboratory) 
over the Redstone proposal of Sept. 1955 !!
5. May lead to intensified US effort -- our five year plan!
6. Causes me to be very sorry to miss the inevitable
reconsideration & perhaps marked changes of 
the US program.
7. May be a genuine loss of opportunity for us at SUI
[State University of Iowa] to assume a larger role 
in the future! By TWX news today the CSAGI 
proposed the setting up of an international 
committee of not to exceed six men for the 
coordination of rocket and satellite programs!
7. [sic] Very sensible choice of frequencies for
ionospheric information and radio amateur 
interest.
8. Evidently rather high power. Probably Radiated
Power ~ or > 10 watts. Perhaps as much as 
100 watts.
9. Assume 10 watts & 50% efficiency = 20 watts
consumed. Assume, out of total weight 
announced of 184 lbs. that 150 lbs. are 
batteries giving 40 watt-hr/lb = 6000 watt hr. 
or 300 hours of operation or -  2 wks 
operation! May have been solar batteries, 
though there has been no hint of this in the 
announcement and I judge their inclusion to 
be somewhat out of character with the simple, 
brute-force approach of the Russians!
10. ?? Where do we stand now on Vanguard?
11. The decision -  2 months ago to ‘regroup’ the
Vanguard program and Townsend’s hint in 
Cambridge of Security Council action = advance 
knowledge in U.S. of status of the Russian 
program !
12. The pompous character of the White House
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announcem ents!
13. The feebleness of the optical approach to tracking
to the radio approach strongly dem onstrated 
as I have urged for some time.
14. ‘O ur’ high-brow choice of 108 mc/sec and why
weak signal out of reach of most amateurs 
and the average population.
15. The astute choice by U.S.S.R. of frequencies
which literally millions of persons can hear directly!
Van Allen confirmed his shipboard observations with an October 
5, 1957, cable from the USS Glacier to the IGY office in 
Washington, DC. In the cable message, Van Allen credits 
Radioman Third Class David Armbrust with the “discovery” of the 
Sputnik signals and indicates they were “confirmed and 
recorded” by Iowa scientists aboard.
Hardware exchanges proposed
Among the resolutions drafted amid the excitement of the CSAGI 
Rocket and Satellite Conference of Sept. 30-0ctober 5, 1957, 
was this one: “ It is highly desirable that there be an exchange of 
publications, technical data, and scientific instruments pertaining 
to satellites, and the Conference recommends to the National 
Committees of both the US. and the USSR that they draw up and 
present to each other their specific proposals for such 
exchange” .
Within a few weeks of the Conference -- only 10 days before the 
US successfully launched Explorer I on January 31 ,19 57  -- an 
IGY working group developed a list of possible hardware 
exchange items, which included a US Aerobee rocket, a Soviet 
meteorological rocket and a short list of instruments, including 
spectrographs, magnetometers, satellite data links and solar 
power supplies in use and under development by both American 
and Soviet space scientists. Specifically, those items included:
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USA items USSR items
Aerobee rocket
Mass spectrom eter (NRL)
Electron beam magnetom eter (NRL)
Satellite data links: 
recording and 
SUI counter 
Telemetering system 
Proton precession m agnetometer
Solar power supplies
Meteorological rocket 
Magnetic m agnotom eter 
Spectrographs,
30-300A & 600-500A 
with electronic 
telemetering
X-ray coronoagraph 
Proton precession 
m agnetom eter 
Solar power supplies
In a letter written three days after the successful launch of 
Explorer I, Herbert Friedman, chairman of the IGY ad hoc 
committee on exchange of instrumentation, forwarded the list of 
proposed hardware exchange items to Hugh Odishaw, the 
executive secretary of the US National Committee for the IGY, 
encouraging him to “obtain approval of US Government 
authorities for the proposed exchange”. In his letter Friedman 
notes that the upcoming CSAGI Conference scheduled for 
August 1958 in Moscow “will offer an excellent opportunity to 
implement the CSAGI exchange resolution” (VAP 240:1).
Friedman notes in his letter that “The Russian delegation to the 
CSAGI Conference indicated a definite interest in obtaining items 
listed in the USA column below”. Van Allen said in December 
2000 that, to his knowledge, no hardware exchange ever 
occurred.
Curiously, one American scientist attending a space physics 
conference in Leningrad in November of 1957 -- a month after 
Sputnik I -- brought home a small piece of Soviet space 
hardware, quite by chance. Herb Friedman, a pioneer of radio
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astronomy affiliated with the US Naval Research Laboratory, was 
en route to the conference when Sputnik II was launched on 
November 3, 1957. Upon his arrival he asked his Russian hosts 
about the instruments on board, and they took him to a trade fair 
where a cutaway replica of the satellite was being displayed. The 
instruments, he saw, included a tape recorder, a radio transm itter 
and two glass Geiger tubes used to detect radiation. Friedman 
made a note of the tubes’ serial numbers.
The next day, while wandering the streets near his Leningrad 
hotel, Friedman passed a store that sold laboratory equipment to 
schools. He noticed in the window a Geiger tube identical to the 
one in the Sputnik II cutaway. A clerk inside the store said the 
tube was in stock. Friedman bought two for one ruble and put 
them into his coat pocket after the clerk wrapped each in 
newspaper. Upon his return to the US, he was questioned by a 
naval intelligence agent about what he had learned while in 
Russia of Sputnik II. The CIA, Friedman was told, had learned 
nothing. Friedman found his coat and retrieved the Geiger tubes 
from his pocket, still wrapped in pages from Pravda. The 
astonished agent promptly borrowed them (Park 74).
“Too general to be workable”
Nine months into the space race, the international space science 
community gathered in Moscow for the fifth meeting of the CSAGI 
held from July 31 to August 9, 1958. According to a report 
prepared by William W. Kellogg of the RAND Corporation, the 
“most urgent m atters” involved “the organization of programs for 
international cooperation which would continue the work of the 
IGY in many fields of geophysics” (VAP 237:3).
The meeting also represented the first review of geophysical and 
astrophysical research by US and Soviet satellites. By then, the 
Soviets had successfully launched three Sputniks, while the US 
had successfully launched three Explorer satellites and Vanguard
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I. At the meeting 77 scientific papers were presented. Twelve of 
those papers were selected for publication in The Journal o f 
Planetary and Space P hys ics , and all eventually appeared in the 
Annals o f the IGY.
At the meeting, the CSAGI Working Group on Rockets and 
Satellites continued its efforts to finalise a plan for international 
coordination of research and the efficient and rapid exchange of 
observations and results. Among the nations actively represented 
in the Working Group were the US, the USSR, the UK, Japan, 
Australia and South Africa.
The results were, according to Kellogg, not entirely successful: 
Although some progress was made in obtaining a 
better understanding of the achievements and aims 
of the various programmes in each of the countries 
represented, (acting) Chairman (Dr. Homer E.) Newell 
(Jr.) was forced to admit, in his address to the closing 
plenary session, that the international agreements 
which had existed were too general to be workable, 
and that the W orking Group had not been able to 
arrive at more detailed agreements in the area of 
rocket and satellite research.
Kellogg notes in something of an aside that hope remained for 
international cooperation: “The fact that satellites, by their very 
nature, cross national boundaries and signal their messages to 
all parts of the world makes them uniquely international -- a sort 
of symbol of worldwide scientific endeavor. So it seems 
inevitable that the working arrangements for the international use 
of these scientific tools will eventually be made” .
Kellogg also notes that his summary of the meeting, by necessity, 
focuses on “the subject matter being studied rather than the 
vehicle” .
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A trip to Moscow
Work on Explorer IV and V and other satellite projects precluded 
Van Allen from being among the 227 space scientists who 
gathered in Moscow for the fifth and final CSAGI meeting in 1958. 
“ I was up to my ears in work on Explorer 4 and 5 and on the 
Argus test,” Van Allen said in a December 2000 interview. In his 
place, he sent a University of Iowa post-doctoral student, Ernest 
Ray, who reported the first Explorer I and Explorer III findings.
A year later, Van Allen was able to accept an invitation to 
participate in another, post-IGY space physics meeting in 
Moscow. Before leaving for Moscow in July of 1959, Van Allen 
was approached at his laboratory in Iowa City by, he presumes, 
an agent of the US Central Intelligence Agency, who asked him 
for help in gathering specific information about the Soviet science 
community and its research.
“The first time it happened to me, it was sort of amusing” , Van 
Allen said in a July 1999 interview:
The CIA must have a branch office in St. Louis, 
and this person from there, who described himself 
only as a “representative of the U.S. governm ent” , 
showed up one day, unannounced, at my office.
He wondered if I would help by finding out the 
names of persons involved in the Soviet space 
program. He was also interested in my assessment 
of the quality and scope of the Russian space 
program and the location of Russian launching 
sites. He was particularly interested in getting names 
of important people. I support the US government;
I told him I would find out what I could.
When I got back, I was in Washington, DC and was 
approached by three agents, who wanted to know 
if I could make an “oral report” on my trip. They
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interviewed me in a hotel room in DC, which 
apparently they had rented for the purpose.
I don’t know if they thought the place was bugged, 
but I remember they were playing music on the 
radio during my report. I had inspected a lot of 
stuff in the labs there (Moscow), and I told them 
what I learned and my assessment of Soviet 
capabilities and the quality of their work. I would 
receive subsequent visits about once a year for 
the next four or five years. I never knew anything 
worth mentioning, but I was happy to collaborate.
I like the US government.
When he arrived in Moscow, Van Allen found his Soviet 
counterparts eager to discuss his findings, and their own, he said 
in a July 1999 interview:
I was prepared for a lack of candor and a fair 
amount of secretiveness, but what happened 
was I couldn’t get them to stop talking. They were 
very proud of what they had done, and they 
seemed to be laboring under an international 
inferiority complex. I thought that to give so 
many papers at their own meeting was a bit 
ungracious. But they were dying to tell us what 
they were doing, and were apparently free to 
do so.
While I was there, Leonid Sedov (a prominent 
Soviet space physicist) asked me if I would be 
willing to go out to the Soviet Academy (of Sciences).
They whisked me out there in a car, and I attended 
a meeting of 12 to 15 people. Through an 
interpreter (Soviet space physicist Yuri Galperin)
I did a two-hour seminar with a lot of slides. They 
asked some very searching questions. Some were 
real killers. One of them was: “How did you know 
that the radiation you discovered w asn’t the result
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of a burst from a US nuclear weapons test”? I had 
the benefit of the Argus observations (a top-secret 
US experiment involving the detonation of low-yield 
hydrogen bomb in space), and the answer was that 
the energy of the particles was quite different. Argus 
had shown us that it was quite easy to distinguish 
between fission electrons and those that were 
naturally produced.
Yuri Galperin, in a December 12, 2000, letter to Van Allen, recalls 
the meeting and his involvement as a participant and translator as 
Van Allen and colleague Paul Kellog described the results of the 
Argus experiment. “You cannot imagine the preparations for this 
meeting in the Academy” , Galperin wrote:
It was decided by somebody that the quantity 
of Soviet participants will be equal to that of 
Americans. While I already had some 
experience in space research, published papers 
on particle measurements in space and the main 
mechanism of the inner belt formation of the 
radiation belt, the choice of myself as interpreter 
was obviously aimed also to reduce the amount 
of people who hear and contact you. The main 
hall of the Academy., which is usually filled with 
chairs and tables for Academy meetings (or only 
with chairs), was emptied, with only a table in 
the center with ‘a chair per person’. I was 
young and impressed by the visible importance 
of the meeting, so my translation was far from 
good -  I wanted to translate most exactly 
and repeatedly asked questions for clarification.
It was an example of good will and scientific 
cooperation spirit, which was very important at 
that rather hard time, and not less now... But I am 
sure we all -- the Soviet participants -- were 
impressed by the generosity of the American
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side in sharing the geophysical data of such 
a specific experiment.
Galperin said in e-mail correspondence to the author on 
February 18, 2001, that Soviet scientists relied heavily on 
scientific journals, and even newspaper coverage, for information 
on space physics research in the US and other countries. “We 
had all the main scientific journals at hand, as all the Soviet 
sciences (did) at the tim e”, he wrote. “Actually there were not so 
many (nor were they) so expensive as now” .
Direct correspondence between Soviet space physicists and 
their international colleagues was rare, Galperin said. “Letters to 
foreign scientists were already not in mode, as (corresponding) 
was in the last century and earlier when no -- or (only) a few — 
regular journals were in use. ... Also at the time newspapers were 
interested in space science, so some new results sometimes 
were first seen there, and it kept us oriented, what paper to 
search urgently” .
Galperin notes in e-mail correspondence to the author on 
January 22, 2001, that international cooperation was then the 
rule, not the exception, but also notes that things have changed 
over the last 40 years.
“Science, especially natural sciences, was always a school of 
international cooperation, a unique area of mutual helping in 
understanding Nature” , he wrote:
And personal relations to some extent, despite 
obvious difficulties in language, in traditions, in 
many other things, in a way reflected that basic 
sim ilarity between the scientists in the competing 
countries. I can tell you that I count among my 
good friends such outstanding American space 
scientists as Tim Donahue, Carl Mcllwain and the 
late Bill Hanson, and I am very proud of that.
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At the same time (there was) some sportive-like 
competition: Who was the first to find, measure, 
understand, to publish, (which) was and is quite 
natural, a typical thing in science. And the glory 
of the country evidently enters here. Unfortunately 
I see during my rather long life a significant change 
in the mood of some American scientists, especially 
among younger ones, not to cite the Russian papers 
even when they are certainly aware of them or even 
have read them. I have heard that such citations can 
create difficulties in getting grants in the US ... We in 
our country had the same during Stalin time (before 
World War II and till the mid-fifties), so we are 
sensitive to such non-objectivity, sometimes 
reaching immorality.
Galperin said in his February 18, 2001, correspondence with the 
author that, like Van Allen and his US colleagues, the activities of 
Soviet space scientists were being monitored by the Soviet 
equivalent of the CIA, the KGB:
Certainly there was some monitoring and 
censorship as were connected with rockets, 
satellites, (and) classified industries. I considered 
it normal in the time of cold war. However, in 
the physical results we were free to discuss 
and publish what we want(ed), if there was 
nothing which could be connected with weaponry.
For example, I had unique measurements from the 
two satellites, Kosmos-3 and especially Kosmos-5, 
during (the) American nuclear high-altitude explosion 
“Starfish” in 1962. It took some time to treat and 
understand these data, but already in 1965 I 
presented the main results (at an) open conference, 
and they were immediately published in the 
proceedings of the conference in the same year, 
and no difficulties with the publication were met. 
(Additionally), there were other publications on
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this rather hot subject in our journal Co sm ic Research 
(as well as) my report on the COSPAR Conference in 
London in 1967.
Van A llen’s experiences in Moscow left him impressed by his 
Soviet counterparts and provided direct insight into the quality of 
their research.
“Their instrumentation was pretty primitive, and I was impressed 
by the lack of m iniaturization” , Van Allen said. “They were still 
using vacuum tubes and equipment with heavy chassis, while we 
were miniaturizing and developing technology that was all low- 
weight. They could get away with that, because they had big 
rockets".
Van Allen and Sedov became friends. Before leaving Moscow, 
Van Allen offered to submit a paper about early US findings for 
publication in a Soviet scientific journal. When he did so, Sedov 
was delighted. In a September 14,1959, letter written in Russian 
and addressed to “Deeply esteemed colleague” , Sedov thanked 
Van Allen for his submission and said he had forwarded the 
paper to the editor of the journal Progress in Physical Science 
and that it would be translated and published in that journal. 
Sedov also told Van Allen he could expect to receive an 
honorarium for his work -  “probably a small sum” (VAP 209:1).
In that same letter, Sedov responded to an invitation from Van 
Allen to visit his space physics laboratory at the University of 
Iowa. “ In the event of my going to the USA, it would please me 
very much to meet with you and become acquainted with your 
observations” .
The Russians Are Coming
Sedov did travel to the US -- two months later as part of a Soviet 
delegation attending a Washington D.C. meeting of the American
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Rocket Society. With Sedov already in America, Van Allen 
dispatched identical telegrams simultaneously to the Soviet 
Embassy in Washington and to the Russian Desk of the US State 
Department on November 18, 1959:
Have invited Soviet scientific party of Professor 
Leonid Sedov and four others now at the 
American Rocket Society meetings in Washington 
to visit this University on 22, 23 and 24 N ovem ber...
Suggest visit to our laboratories on Monday and 
Tuesday. Would be grateful if Professor Sedov 
would give general University lecture on Monday 
evening on space research in the Soviet Union 
and Professor Krassovsky a colloquium for 
department of physics and astronomy on 
Tuesday a fte rnoon .... I consider this visit of 
considerable international value and would 
appreciate your assistance in making it possible”
(VAP 209:3).
Despite the short notice, Sedov and his four colleagues 
extended their visits to America to travel to Iowa City. Though 
Sedov was known to Van Allen both personally and 
professionally, neither Van Allen, nor anyone else apparently,
knew much about some of the other Russians in the entourage.
A document informally titled “Some Biographical Details” in the 
Van Allen Papers (VAP 209:3) showed that Sedov, then 52, was 
the newly-elected president of the International Astronautical 
Federation and, since April of 1955, had been the chairman of 
the USSR National Academy of Sciences’ interdepartmental 
Commission on Interplanetary Communications, described in the 
biographical notes as a “group of 27 (that) includes 8 
academicians (the academy had 152 academicians, according to 
another notation) and seems to be the equivalent of the US NAS 
(National Academy of Sciences) Science Board, but with broader 
powers including some of those of our NASA” .
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The Soviet delegation would also include Antoli A. Blagonravov, 
then 65, a “ballistics and armaments specialist” who had been 
awarded the Stalin prize in 1941 for work on “The Principles of 
Planning Automatic W eapons” . The notes show that Blagonrav 
headed the 1957 Soviet delegation to IGY’s Washington DC 
Conference on Rockets and Satellites and had authored an 
article entitled “ Investigation of the Upper Layers of the 
Atmosphere by Means of High-Altitude Rockets” in the June 1957 
journal of the USSR National Academy of Sciences.
Also coming to Iowa City was Valerian I. Krassovsky, who was 
identified in a page-eight article in The New York Times of 
November 17, 1959, as chief of the department of research in 
upper atmospheric physics as the Institute of Atmospheric Physics 
in Moscow. Van A llen’s biographical notes indicate a long list of 
research interests in astronomy and geophysics, including 
cosmic ray research.
The group would also include Professor V.G. Kostomarov, 
identified in Van A llen’s holographic notes as a “ linguist & 
interpreter” and Dr. Y. Galkin, about whom there was “no
inform ation” .
Van Allen oversaw an ambitious 12-hour schedule of activities for 
the Soviets on Tuesday, November 24, 1959. It included an 
orientation to the Van Allen team ’s work, tours of various 
University of Iowa space physics laboratories, and a lecture to 
physics students by Valerian I. Krassovsky, entitled “Radiation 
Observations with Soviet Satellites and Cosmic Rockets” . Dinner 
with faculty and spouses Tuesday evening was followed by L.l. 
Sedov’s public lecture, entitled “Space Research by the Soviet 
Union” . That event was followed by a 9:30 p.m. press conference.
Van Allen recalls discussing with Sedov while meeting with him in 
Iowa City the socially and politically pervasive impact of Sputnik I 
on American culture, and on Van Allen’s own work. “ I remarked 
how Sputnik helped jump-start space research in the U.S.” , Van
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Allen said in 1999. “Sedov smiled and said, through the 
interpreter: ‘Yes. Yes. It works both ways’”.
Upon his return to Moscow, Sedov sent Van Allen a letter, hand­
written in English, thanking him for hosting the visit to Iowa City. 
“We wish you all successes in life and your interesting 
researches” , the November 28, 1959, letter says in part. “Please 
convey our best wishes to your nice fam ily and members of your 
department. We hope w e ’ll have other opportunities of meeting 
you” (VAP 209:1).
“They were as open as we were”
Throughout the early days of space science exploration, Van 
Allen and his colleagues within the US space community relied 
heavily on international meetings and on papers published in a 
range of scientific journals for insights into new findings and 
theories. Personal contacts between US and Soviet scientists 
were limited, even in the form of correspondence, Van Allen 
recalls:
“We learned what the Soviet scientists were up to through IGY 
annals and meetings” , he said. “ I thought they were as open as 
we were, and, in the scientific culture, I expected this. We got to 
be mutually respectful, but there was not much contact, except at 
these meetings. I wrote some letters (to Soviet counterparts) and 
basically never heard back from them, although, when I saw them 
later, they said they got the letters. I don’t think it was possible for 
them to get a letter out. I think there was very strong censorship” .
In one of his infrequent face-to-face encounters with his Soviet 
counterparts outside an international conference, Van Allen 
compared scientific notes with Sergi Vernov. A highly regarded 
Soviet space physicist, it was Vernov who might have 
“discovered” the Van Allen Radiation Belts months before Van 
Allen, if not for the in-flight failure of a crucial data recorder
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aboard Sputnik III (Harford 136), or, as Van Allen put it: “The 
rascals did themselves in with scarce data” .
“Vernov came to the States in 1960, and I met him at the Cosmos 
Club in Washington, D.C.”, Van Allen recalled in July 2000. “We 
had dinner and talked about what each of us was doing. We met 
alone, without translators and, as far as we were aware, no KGB 
or CIA presence. He knew enough English that we were able to 
meet just together, alone. The language issue made conversation 
a little slow, but as far as the content was concerned, it was not a 
problem ” .
Journals and annals of international scientific organisations were 
a principal source of information and communication for the 
world’s space scientists, Van Allen said, although the logistics or 
acquisition and translation often dated content:
The International Astronomical Union was a 
very prestigious organisation of astronomers 
from around the world, including the Chinese, 
who did not participate in IGY. The proceedings 
of the IAU allowed free exchange of information.
In fact, the catalog of asteroids, where astronomers 
would record their discoveries of asteroids and their 
locations and movements, was published in St.
Petersburg (Russia). In that era (the late 1950s) 
the IAU was flourishing, and it served as a medium 
of exchange and acquaintanceship.
Van A llen’s papers contain copies of two New York-based 
commercial publications -- Physics Express and Soviet H ighlights 
-  that provided translations of Soviet scientific papers. Volume 1, 
Number 1 of Physics Express appeared in June 1958, billing itself 
as a “new comprehensive digest of current Russian literature 
dealing with physics topics”. In a message from the publisher -- 
International Physical Index, Inc. -- the journal promised 
“extensive coverage” of material gleaned from 68 Russian 
journals, claiming “about half of these journals have, to our
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knowledge, never been available to American engineers, at 
large, in English” . The publication also promised “timely 
publication” through editorial procedures designed to report on 
Russian research and development work “many months faster 
than is possible by other means now available” . The first issue 
included translations of nine complete articles, 29 excerpts in the 
authors’ own words and 65 abstracts. The subject of the first 
volum e’s lead article is “cosmic rays and elementary particles” .
Van Allen said his team relied heavily Ernest Ray, a postdoctoral 
student at the University of Iowa and later an assistant professor, 
for quick translations of Russian papers and other documents: 
Ernie had learned to read Russian, and he 
became our departm ent’s principal translator.
The (University of Iowa) library also subscribed 
to Pravda, and he would go through that and 
would translate. Pravda had a lot of coverage 
of science, and he and I would sit down and 
read those science reports together. We also 
received Russian journals. The Russians used 
to publish their journals in English, but then after 
the war (WW II), there was a great wave of 
nationalism and they went to publishing them 
in Russian. We hired a young man from the 
(University of Iowa) Russian department to do 
the translations. The problem was there was 
about a year of delay between publication and 
arrival of the journals and the translation. It was 
1960 before we got translations of papers first 
issued in 1958 and 1959.
The substantive side of what I learned about their 
research came out of the IGY, journals and Pravda, 
which devoted a lot of space to science and space.
These stories would not reveal a lot of things, but I 
remember there was a big article on Sputnik III that 
was amazing for its detail. There was a language
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barrier with these publications, and there was 
delay in getting them, and what you really needed 
to assess the work were the numbers, the exact 
information. Even if you hear an oral paper, you 
can’t take it all in. If you really want to work with 
something you need the paper and the figures 
(data), and those were so slow in coming along.
But all along we knew what we needed to do and 
how we would do it. At no time were we dependent 
on the Russians. The competition just highlighted 
the whole thing.
You should understand that, while these papers 
were of interest, we knew what we wanted to do 
and how we would do it. At no time were we 
dependent on the Russians. The rivalry between 
the two countries was essential to the opportunity 
to do the work, but the science was totally 
independent. If the Russians hadn’t existed at all 
we would have done the same things.
When Van Allen and his team were ready to publish data from 
their Explorer I and III instruments, they chose the British journal 
Nature for publication in a conscious effort to minimize any 
delays in sharing their findings with the international space 
physics community. “ It was an international journal and was very 
speedy in terms of turn-around time between acceptance and 
publication” , Van Allen said in a December 2000 interview. “They 
were very fast -  30 days versus six to eight months with some 
journals. They were very courteous and very prompt” .
Van Allen said he was not required -- nor did he -  have the 
article reviewed by any US intelligence agency. “ I don ’t remember 
that any formal review was required” , he said. “The paper was 
sent (to Nature) directly from Iowa City” .
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Analysis
Sarah Van Allen was a “very frightened” six-year-old girl on the 
day in 1959 when she first heard that her father -- American 
space physicist James A. Van Allen -- would be traveling that 
summer to Russia to meet face-to-face with Soviet space 
scientists. “ I had this impression that he was going somewhere 
very dangerous” , she said 42 years later in an April 2001 
interview:
It was the time of the Cold War, and for a child it 
was an environment that was very scary, all this 
talk of bomb shelters and hiding under your desk 
at school. I was so frightened by the idea of him 
going to Russia. I remember thinking they might 
steal things out of his briefcase, and I remember 
asking my father why he was going to Russia 
and asking him wasn't he scared.
I remember him telling me that the fears that I was 
expressing were unfounded. He explained to me 
that, in the scientific community, Americans and 
Russian cooperate, that scientifically they are not 
competing, that what they do transcends w hat’s 
going on in the political arena. He told me it isn’t 
like war because the scientific community worked 
together in terms of sharing ideas and data. And 
when he explained it to me that way, my fears were 
totally abolished. The Cold War never seemed 
as cold to me after that (S. Van Allen interview).
W hat James A. Van Allen never has told his youngest daughter is 
that he was apprehensive, too. “ I had no trouble navigating 
central Moscow, and I was able to master the subways by myself 
and got around without any problems” , he recalled in an April 
2001 interview:
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But I must admit I was apprehensive when I was 
invited to give a lecture at a meeting of the Soviet 
Academy, which involved getting in a car and traveling 
by myself to the outskirts of Moscow. I was uneasy 
about the prospect of disappearing. So I talked two of 
my colleagues who had also made the trip into going 
along with me. My thinking was, if three of us disappeared, 
somebody would notice” (J. Van Allen interview).
Van Allen and his two colleagues returned safely from their visit 
to the Soviet Academy. In fact, the visit had afforded the American 
scientists a chance to put faces to names of scientists whose 
work they had followed in hastily translated Soviet physics 
journals. It had been an opportunity to formalize personal and 
professional relationships. Some of those relationships, despite 
the inherent complications of language, geography, Cold War 
politics and the passage of decades, are ongoing.
This early, direct communication with his colleagues in Moscow 
left Van Allen impressed by his Soviet counterparts and by the 
quality of their research: “ I found that the power of their (Soviet) 
intentions, and their corresponding capabilities, were very high” , 
he said. “They had a feeling for the spirit and the power of the 
work, and they were not kidding around. They were in the big 
leagues in this business. Science absolutely transcends politics, 
and they seemed like our kind of folks” (J. Van Allen interview).
Principle meets politics
This research explores the means of methods of the 
communication strategies employed by US and Soviet space 
scientists at the literal dawn of the “space age” . In the author’s 
multiple personal interviews with American space physicist James 
A. Van Allen and frequent correspondence with Soviet 
counterpart Dr. Yuri Galperin, both scientists repeatedly recalled
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their personal and professional commitments to free and open 
exchange of information. Both discussed their efforts to adopt 
communication strategies that were underpinned by a conscious 
disregard for the political polarity then dividing the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Both Van Allen and Galperin embraced 
then the principle -- an absolute principle in their shared views -- 
that science transcends politics, a view they continue to share 
nearly 50 years later.
The eagerness of Van A llen’s team and the corresponding Soviet 
team that included Galperin to share data, theories, methods and 
insights related to their experimental observations of the Earth’s 
upper atmosphere illustrates two related corollaries both 
expressed and implied by both of scientists: scientific inquiry 
transcends nationalism, and the results of scientific inquiry have 
no ownership, but are instead the “property” of the human race in 
its quest to make sense of the nature of nature.
These earliest commitments to open and frequent communication 
transcended the “us-versus-them” mentality of the Cold War. 
While school children in the United States -- among them Van 
A llen’s own daughter -- were being drilled in taking cover during 
a nuclear (translates: Soviet) missile attack, Soviet and American 
scientists were exchanging experimental data as colleagues, not 
competitors, and certainly not as enemies. Because their 
common involvement in space physics research required the 
involvement of rocket technologies developed by the US and 
Soviet governments as weapons delivery systems, formal and 
informal efforts by these American and Soviet scientists in 
establishing and maintaining open channels of communication 
were complicated by security concerns on the part of the 
governments that were, by necessity, participating in these 
research efforts as co-investigators.
This author’s interviews with Van Allen and Galperin and two 
years of related research show unequivocally that both the 
American and Soviet space science communities understood the
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importance of pursuing space science as an international 
scientific endeavor, despite “official” governm ent security 
concerns. They also reveal how strongly these principals 
collectively embraced the understanding that, as Van Allen puts it, 
“science absolutely transcends politics” .
Nonetheless, as illustrated by both Sarah Van A llen ’s 
apprehensions and those of her father, the efforts by these space 
physics pioneers to insulate their infant specialty of “space 
science” from politics were undertaken amid the backdrop of a 
virtual fire storm of social, political and economic turmoil kindled 
by the Soviet’s successful launch of Sputnik. Their activities did 
not take place in either a professional or political vacuum, and it 
should be noted that their insistence on open exchange of 
information characterises only their own experiences as both the 
US and the Soviets entered the space age.
While this research illustrates that open communication was the 
norm of space science between 1957 and 1959 -- the period 
under review here -- it needs to be remembered that the work of 
the Van Allen and Galperin teams was the only pure science 
high-altitude research underway at that time. In 1957 and 1958 
there were no other space physics experiments being carried 
into Earth orbit except those these teams had devised; the total 
sum of knowledge being accumulated -- and communicated -- 
was the result of the earliest Sputnik and Explorer launches. 
These inaugural missions “ invented” the specialty of space 
physics. And the inventors -- Van Allen, Galperin and their 
immediate colleagues -- set the tone for unrestricted, non­
proprietary exchange and access to data in this new field of 
science. The extent to which this approach endured as space 
science evolved is beyond the scope of this research.
The Politics of IGY
Despite their noble intentions, any suggestion that the activities of
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Van Allen, Galperin and other space physicists of this era were a- 
political would ignore the political and economic realities that 
underpinned the International Geophysical Year and the space 
science inherent in this global research effort. While the specific 
agendas for the ambitious array of IGY research were set by 
international committees of scientists, the funding for these 
projects -- more than $2 billion by one estimate (Merrill Lynch 10) 
-- came, directly and indirectly, from the 66 governm ents involved 
and from the United Nations. This government involvement, by 
definition, made IGY a political affair, and there is ample evidence 
that a variety of US governmental agencies -- not the least of 
them the Department of Defense (DoD) -- was both interested in 
IGY research and actively involved in funding and assisting such 
research (Killian 136).
It must be noted, too, than Van Allen was no “babe in the woods” 
when it came to the political context of physics research. Van 
Allen came to space physics research from his ordnance 
research as a US Naval officer. During World War II, Van Allen 
helped perfect a proxim ity fuse that triggered detonation of anti­
aircraft artillery shells as they “sensed” targets nearby. After the 
war, Van A llen’s work with high-altitude rockets for a research 
group at the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins 
University involved instruments developed by the US Naval 
Ordnance Laboratory and included launchings of rockets at a US 
military base (White Sands, 1948) and from the decks of US Navy 
ships in the eastern Pacific in 1949 and the Gulf of Alaska in 1950 
(VAP 236:1). In short, Van Allen’s earliest research was the 
product of defence appropriations in an era when rockets were 
perceived as munitions rather than a means of placing pure 
science research instruments into low-earth orbit. His loyalties to 
the US Navy extended beyond his wartime commission, and, as 
this research reveals, Van Allen was not averse to occasional 
interactions with the US Central Intelligence Agency.
Van Allen is fond of noting that his experiment was selected for 
the first US satellite mission because, in his words, he was “lucky
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to be in the right place at the right time” . In reality, luck was never 
involved. As the US Army-backed Project Orbiter/Redstone 
rocket development team headed by W ernher von Braun was 
competing against the Viking rocket designed by US Navy, Van 
Allen was busy in his laboratory at the State University of Iowa, 
designing and building an instrument payload that would fit the 
spatial and weight requirements of either booster system 
(Burrows 79).
Setting the IGY agenda
US involvement in IGY was coordinated by the National Academy 
of Sciences (NAS), a civilian agency with the broadest scientific 
responsibilities in the US federal government. In creating the NAS 
the US Congress included in its mandate the responsibility to 
assume leadership in sponsoring basic scientific research and 
coordinating broad scientific programmes that involved multiple 
agencies, institutions and scientific organisations. In February of 
1953, the NAS appointed a National Research Council, which in 
turn appointed the US National Committee for the International 
Geophysical Year. That com m ittee’s members were selected for 
their “scientific capabilities” from various public and private 
institutions (VAP 236:2). It was this committee that ultimately 
approved the research agenda for US scientists involved in IGY 
activities, including rocketry.
The US DoD and the US State Department both took a keen 
interest in IGY research activities. In the spring of 1954, proposals 
for US involvement in IGY research were circulated by the 
National Science Foundation to various US governmental 
agencies, soliciting comments on proposed research and 
associated budgets. In a March 19,1954, letter from Donald A. 
Quarles, assistant secretary of defence, to Joseph M. Dodge, 
director of the US Bureau of the Budget, the DoD makes its 
position clear:
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From a scientific point of view the Department of 
Defense has definite interest in certain elements of 
the program. There is no doubt that the results of a 
coordinated world-wide effort in the main fields of 
atmospheric physics can be expected to yield basic 
information not only of general technical value but of 
value to our national defense problems. Of particular 
importance to us would be basic information relevant 
to radio and weather predictions and the properties of 
the upper atmosphere. Advances in these fields require 
investigation of several phenomena including the 
ionosphere, aurora, geomagnetism, solar activity, 
cosmic rays, and atmospheric winds. Many of these 
observations can be obtained only by the rocket 
probing capability developed by the Department of 
Defense (VAP 236:2).
In a more detailed DoD analysis of the US IGY program dated 
May 19, 1954, a report from the Department’s Coordinating 
Committee on General Sciences notes that US activities involving 
rockets could not be pursued without direct DoD involvement:
The capability to execute the IGY program using 
rockets as a probing device resides altogether 
within DoD laboratories or their contractors. It has 
been determined that each department can fire a 
number of rockets or other vehicles over and above 
its proposed program and, in toto, Defense can 
accomplish the number of firings specified in the 
IGY program for both ground and air launched 
vehicles. Therefore, the IGY program will be carried 
out as an above-normal effort by DoD agencies 
(VAP 236:2).
The US State Department offered its assessment of IGY to Alan T.
54
Waterman, director of the National Science Foundation. A “for the 
Secretary of State” letter sent on April 20, 1954, to Waterman 
from Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy reads in part:
As to the Departm ent’s views on the American part in 
the IGY, this proposal is consistent with the objectives 
of our foreign policy. Since World War I the Department 
has encouraged and supported American participation 
in the International Council of Scientific Unions and its 
affiliated scientific unions. It has followed this course 
because the scientific knowledge these organizations 
develop is essential to our national interests in 
navigation, communication, commerce, and other 
important fields of a global nature. The American 
program for the IGY, together with the programs of 
the other participating countries, constitute a real 
opportunity for accelerating the accumulation and 
refinement of such knowledge (VAP 236:2).
The same letter speaks to the US governm ent’s endorsement of 
the IGY goal of encouraging international scientific cooperation:
The Department of State itself has traditionally fostered 
international cooperation. The IGY can be regarded as 
an instrument for such cooperation. The proposal will 
afford many occasions for scientists of different countries 
to work together for great common ends in fields of 
endeavor in which, from a scientific point of view, 
international boundaries are not significant -- and 
scientists in these modern days must be looked upon 
more and more as an important and influential element 
of society. In this context the proposal can contribute 
much to stimulating friendly international relations 
(VAP 236:2).
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Follow the money
Initial financial support for IGY, outside the International Council 
of Scientific Unions, came from the United Nations (UN) through 
its United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO). The UN organization provided a grant 
of $1,400 to subsidise the costs of CSAGI’s plenary meeting in 
Brussels in October of 1952, plus an additional $1,000 for 
“preparatory work” for IGY. Another $2,000 in UNESCO funding 
was provided for the second CSAGI meeting in Rome in October 
of 1954. UNESCO also approved a $5,000 allocation to CSAGI 
for establishment of a permanent secretariat, which was followed 
by a subsequent grant of $15,000. The UN organisation also 
gave the IGY committee an additional $15,000 in 1956 for the 
maintenance of the permanent secretariat (Buedeler 23).
Beyond this initial UN seed money, funding for IGY came from the 
governments of the countries involved. A February 1958 analysis 
of IGY funding by the Wall Street investment firm of Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner and Beane puts the total, worldwide cost at $2.5 
billion:
Funds for the IGY are paid through the National 
Science Foundation, a Federal agency established 
by Congress in 1951 to provide support for basic 
research. So far Congress has granted the agency 
$39,000,000 for the IGY program with half the cash 
tagged for the satellite and rocketry section. The IGY 
committee does no contracting: instead, its asks US 
universities and laboratories to submit programs for 
work they are equipped to do or would like to tackle 
(Merrill Lynch, 8).
The same analysis -- published within a week of the successful 
launch of Explorer 1 and presumably written prior to that event --
56
notes that the cost of the US satellite program has climbed “like 
the Sun at dawn” :
The earlier-than-expected Sputnick [sic] II launching 
not only brought sharp pressure to speed up US 
satellite development but also created extra costs 
connected with the tracking and data collection of the 
Sputniks. Case in point: Smithsonian Astrophysical 
Observatory was granted $3,300,000 to organize and 
operate the optical tracking program but admits it will 
not be able to carry its work to the end of IGY, partially 
because it doubled its IGY-paid personnel to 70 
several months earlier planned (Merrill.Lynch 8-9).
The Merrill Lynch analysis also notes that the Eisenhower 
Administration’s budget for fiscal year 1959 allocates $150 million 
to the National Science Foundation, three times its appropriation 
for the previous budget year. “Part of the Foundation 
appropriation will undoubtedly be used to swell IGY funds, 
especially the satellite and rocketry program,” the analysis says 
on page nine.
The report also quotes IGY organiser Lloyd Berkner’s estimate of 
the cost of US participation in IGY as “in the neighborhood of 
$100,000,000” and world-wide costs to “much closer to 
$500,000,000” (Merrill Lynch 9). The report contrasts Berkner’s 
IGY cost estimates with those of John A. Simpson of the Enrico 
Fermi Institute, a physics laboratory near Chicago. S im pson’s 
estimate predicts $250 million to $300 million would be spent for 
scientific equipment and salaries and that participating nations 
would spend an additional $1.8 billion for “direct logistical 
support.” Another $250 million to $500 million, Simpson 
predicted, would be required for data collection, handling and 
analysis and for the costs of IGY observations in “remote 
regions” under study. “This comes to a grand total of around $2.5 
billion,” the Merrill Lynch report states (Merrill Lynch 10).
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Beyond financial considerations, the Merrill Lynch analysis of IGY 
also comments on the political context of the effort, linking the 
Soviet Union’s involvement to the death of Josef Stalin:
The death of Stalin in early 1953 and the subsequent 
reshuffling of certain Soviet tactics came early enough 
in the preparatory period [for IGY] to enable the Iron 
Curtain nations to participate actively. W hatever the 
Soviet’s political motives, most scientists hail this 
activity as a hopeful sign of improved international 
cooperation -- at least in the scientific field 
(Merrill Lynch 5).
The Merrill Lynch report also makes note of the military 
implications of IGY:
While scientists consider it a concrete example of 
international cooperation, IGY nonetheless cannot 
escape certain m ilitary associations. Much data on 
the nature of outer space, exact geographic locations, 
weather and communications have military interest; 
Antarctic scientific programs may lead to the 
establishment of permanent bases; satellites can 
develop into reconnaissance vehicles and possibly 
even weapons carriers, while launching and 
guidance apparatus is related to the missile field.
Scientists remain confident all basic data will be 
promptly released (and) say Soviet release of 
scientific information would amaze the uninformed 
outsider. But problems of secrecy (at least in closely 
related scientific endeavors) persist. W hile everyone 
agrees strictly missile information must be properly 
guarded, failure to release the basic scientific 
information could seriously interfere with the IGY 
objective and hamstring research needed for both
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US peacetime prosperity and military security 
(Merrill Lynch 5).
Experiments in concert
The seminal role played by the IGY in encouraging international 
scientific cooperation cannot be over-emphasized. Van Allen and 
his Soviet counterparts were among 60,000 scientists from 66 
nations who staffed thousands of observation stations, literally 
from pole to pole, while undertaking IGY experiments and 
observations (Sullivan 4). As the superpowers were busy 
obsessing over the throw-weights of rocket systems that could be 
outfitted with heavy nuclear warheads, this cadre of international 
science talent was busy following the 17th Century advice of 
Francis Bacon, who encouraged scientists to pursue a global 
scientific method grounded in “experiments in concert” .
It should be noted, too, that more than a few of the formal 
informational exchange strategies proposed for the IGY never 
materialised during the 18-month observation period. These 
included two proposed IGY World Data Centers, envisioned as 
archival repositories in which all data collected during IGY would 
be cataloged and made available to scientists around the around. 
Similar centers were later established and continue to function, 
but the concept was not immediately embraced. Minutes of IGY 
planning sessions contained within the Van Allen Papers clearly 
show that efforts to formalise IGY information exchange and 
communication protocols were undermined by Soviet 
government concerns about free exchange of information 
revealing specifics of the launch vehicle and the telemetry 
technologies used to orbit Soviet scientific payloads.
It is also interesting to note that James A. Van A llen’s first efforts to 
grasp the significance of Sputnik were grounded in his own
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direct observations, an approach one might expect of an 
advocate and veteran of scientific method. As this research 
reveals in some detail, Am erica’s preeminent space scientist was, 
quite literally, half-a-world away from the “action” when his 
international space physics colleagues, who were gathered 
together in Washington, DC for the Conference on Rockets and 
Satellites, first learned of the successful launch of Sputnik on 
October 4, 1957. His logbook entries on that historic date reveal 
not only his excitement over the news, but his immediate efforts to 
capture the satellite’s radio signal and to study its properties with 
the crude equipment at hand. His logbook contains page after 
page of detailed notes and sketches pertaining to his 
observations of the 95-minute orbital passes that he and others 
aboard the USS Glacier tracked throughout Sputnik’s first day in 
space.
As a final observation, it is important to note that Van Allen and 
his Russian counterpart Galperin both feel the commitment to 
international scientific cooperation and open communication of 
data, methods and theories that was embraced by IGY 
organisers and participants has been eroding. As Galperin noted 
in e-mail correspondence with the author:
Unfortunately I see during my rather long life 
a significant change in the mood of some American 
scientists, especially among younger ones, not 
to cite the Russian papers even when they are 
certainly aware of them or even have read them.
I have heard that such citations can create 
difficulties in getting grants in the US.
Van Allen agrees: “ I think there is a lack of meaningful 
collaboration these days” , he said in a May 2001 interview.
Not overtly, in the sense of saying, ‘W e’re not 
going to cooperate with those damn Russians’, 
but, while the activity has stayed high, international 
cooperation has not. There ’s a lack of
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collaboration now to the point where 
American space physicists aren ’t even 
collaborating with each other. A lot of the 
current papers I read are repeating work 
published 10 or 20 years ago as far as 
physical results are concerned, some of 
that work my own, without citation. And, 
when I mention this, I’m told by young 
scientists that today there is no real interest 
in any of the literature that is more than 
five years old.
This is supposed to be an objective business.
But there almost an element of gamesmanship involved, 
where some work is ignored, or scientists will 
cite the papers of their friends or close colleagues 
in a sort of a you scratch my back and I’ll scratch 
yours approach, with the expectation that they 
will turn around and cite their work.
“ I’m no longer in the mainstream of things, but I respect Dr.
Galperin’s impressions”, Van Allen said.
I see almost no citation of Russian work, and I don’t 
see many Russian scientists traveling to conferences 
in the U.S. or getting posts on academic faculties in the 
U.S., which at one point was quite common. I can’t 
remember the last time the Russians had a planetary 
mission, and I haven’t seen NASA involving any 
Russians in any of their international programmes.
I get the impression that there ’s this genera! feeling that the 
US is now superior in their techniques and that the 
Russians are in the backwater of the thing.
Which is exactly how the Russians were being viewed in 1957, is
is not?
“Yes”, Van Allen says with a smile. “ I think that’s right” .
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List of acronyms
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CSAGI Comite Special de I ’Annee Geophysique
Internationale
IAU International Astronom ical Union
IGY International Geophysical Year
KGB (Soviet) Committee of State Security
Mc/s Megacycles per second
NAS/NRC National Academy of Sciences/
National Research Council
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NRL Naval Research Laboratory
RAND Research and Development
SUI State University of Iowa
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organisation
USNC-IGY United States National Committee for the
International Geophysical Year
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USS United States Ship
VAP Van Allen Papers
V-2 Vergeltungswaffe-2 (early German rocket)
WDC World Data Centres
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